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Abstract
We experimentally study the relationship between time inconsistency, sophisti-
cation about time inconsistency, and self-commitment. Previous research has in-
terpreted demand for commitment devices as evidence for the sophistication of a
time-inconsistent decision-maker. In our laboratory experiment, we attempt to mea-
sure sophistication directly by way of a cognitive test. We then test the hypothesis
that people who are both time-inconsistent and show high cognitive capacity take
up commitment devices when offered in the strategic game between their current
and their future self. For experimental laboratory commitment choices, we cannot
detect a moderating effect of cognition on commitment demand of time-inconsistent
subjects. However, we find that the existence of time-inconsistent preferences and
sophistication (proxied by cognitive performance) can predict the demand for sav-
ings commitment in our hypothetical survey vignette question.
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I Introduction
Time-inconsistent preferences, i.e. that people exhibit different levels of patience over time,
have been used to model and explain a wide range of behaviors, including addiction (Gruber
and Ko¨szegi, 2001), excessive credit-card borrowing (Meier and Sprenger, 2010), or that people
save and borrow at the same time (Laibson et al., 2000, 2007). Importantly, an inconsistency in
time-preferences implies exploitability, for present-bias in the sense of Laibson (1997)’s golden
eggs.
To counter her bias, a person may be willing to exert self-control and show demand for
commitment devices in the strategic game between her current and her later self (Fudenberg
and Levine, 2006; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Strotz, 1955, see also Bryan et al., 2010 for a
review). Commitment devices have been shown to be helpful to increase savings (e.g. Ashraf
et al., 2006; Beshears et al., forthcoming; Gugerty, 2007; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), stop
smoking (e.g. Gine´ et al., 2010), reduce alcohol consumption (e.g. Schilbach, 2019; Trope and
Fishbach, 2000), or reduce procrastination and increase work/study output (e.g. Ariely and
Wertenbroch, 2002; Augenblick et al., 2015; Kaur et al., 2015).
However, it is important to note that only sophisticated decision-makers, i.e. people who
are aware of their own time-inconsistency, should show demand for commitment devices (Eliaz
and Spiegler, 2006; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). In the studies cited above, the fact that
a (biased) decision-maker takes up a commitment option is usually interpreted as evidence
that the decision-maker is sophisticated, while a decision-maker who refuses an advantageous
commitment device is labeled as na¨ıve.
Such indirect inference of sophistication may be problematic for several reasons. On the
one hand, uncertainty about the future may give rise to preferences for retaining flexibility
for sophisticated decision-makers, letting them reject commitment devices (see Laibson, 2015
for the theoretical argument and Andreoni et al., forthcoming; Casari and Dragone, 2015 for
experimental evidence). On the other hand, even na¨ıve decision-makers may adopt commitment
contracts when they base their decision on historical data and experienced utility (Laibson,
2018). Additionally, the take-up of commitment devices has been found to be often inconsistent,
both with concurrent and future choices, or subject to more than individual decision factors.1
More recently, some papers aimed to assess the decision-maker’s sophistication about time
inconsistency directly by asking them to predict their own future behavior. Acland and Levy
(2015), Augenblick and Rabin (2019), and Carrera et al. (2019) all find wide-spread naivety
1E.g., DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) find that consumers choose sub-optimal gym commitment contracts
that are not consistent with their eventual attendance frequency. Carrera et al. (2019) report that demand for
commitment contracts for going to the gym more and for going to the gym less is positively correlated. Exley
and Naecker (2017) find more take-up of commitment devices when the commitment choice is public rather
than private.
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about time-inconsistency in work and gym attendance contexts (i.e. a similarity between
present and predicted future choices while both are different to actual future choices), with
people on average predicting only one third or less of the extent of their present bias. The
former two studies do not directly assess how sophistication relates to the take-up of commit-
ment. Carrera et al. (2019) use an information treatment to increase awareness of bias and
thus sophistication, but find that such increased sophistication reduces rather than increases
take-up of commitment contracts. John (forthcoming) takes a different approach and iden-
tifies sophistication through survey measure of self-perceived temptation, but similarly finds
an unpredicted negative correlation between that measure and commitment take-up for biased
subjects.
We complement this literature by attempting to measure (potential for) sophistication by
way of cognitive ability, and verifying whether such cognitive ability is related to the take-up
of commitment contracts offered to time-inconsistent people. Cognitive ability is the ability
of processing mental information in the context of perception, attention, memory, problem
solving, reasoning, and decision making (e.g. Anderson, 2005). In our experiment, we employ
the “Automated Operation Span” (AOS) test introduced by Unsworth et al. (2005), measuring
working memory, which has been found to be correlated with many higher-order cognitive
capabilities and has thus been interpreted as a measure of general cognitive ability (see Engle
and Kane, 2004, for a review). Recent experimental studies have shown that working memory
contributes to explaining suboptimal decisions in guessing games (Rydval et al., 2009) and
performance in forecasting tasks (Rydval, 2007), which seem related to the prediction of own
time-inconsistency.
In our experiment, we detect present-bias or future-bias using Attema et al. (2010)’s time-
tradeoff sequences (TTO), and loosely follow Casari (2009)’s experimental design in offering
commitment contracts to subjects which are tailored to their time-inconsistency. The main
hypothesis we test is that cognitive ability of time-inconsistent subjects is positively correlated
with the take-up of commitment devices.
In our data, we find no relation between our proxy for sophistication (potential) and the take-
up of commitment devices. Regression analysis does not find an effect of time-inconsistency
(measured over similar experimental choices) or cognitive performance and the demand for
commitment, neither directly nor in interaction. That said, the joint existence of present-
bias and a high cognitive level are correlated with the (self-stated) take-up of a commitment
contract in a hypothetical savings survey question. Thus, our paper contributes mixed evidence
to the literature on commitment devices and why people pick them up. While measured
time preferences and cognitive performance as a proxy for sophistication are not helpful in
explaining real commitment choices in the laboratory, they seem to be correlated with related
3
(hypothetical) real-world behavior. As a result, whether a cognitive measure is a good proxy
for sophistication in the context of time preferences and commitment remains an unsolved
question.
II Experimental design and procedures
Time preferences. Our laboratory experiment consisted of four parts. Using a shortened
two-step version of Attema et al. (2010)’s Time Trade-Off sequences, we elicited 4 sequences,
each consisting of 2 chained questions.2 In the first question of a sequence, a participant stated
her willingness-to-wait t in weeks for a larger-later payment $L which makes her indifferent to
a smaller-sooner payment $S in FED weeks (FED stands for “front-end delay”).
($S, FED) ∼ ($L, FED + t)
In the second question, the participant stated her willingness-to-wait t′ (in weeks) for a
larger-later payment $L which makes her indifferent to a smaller-sooner payment $S in FED+t
weeks.
($S, FED + t) ∼ ($L, FED + t + t′)
An increasing willingness to wait over time (t′ > t) indicates present-bias, while a decreasing
willingness-to-wait (t′ < t) represents future bias. Across the four sequences we vary the base
stake size ($S=$100, $L=$130 vs. $S= $200, $L= $240) and the initial front-end delay (1
week vs. 5 weeks). We elicited each question using a multiple price list of 26 binary choices
between $S in FED weeks and $L in FED + t, with the willingness-to-wait t ranging from 1
to 26 weeks. We enforced consistency through a unique (or no) switching point between $S
and $L.3
Commitment choices. In the second part of the experiment, adapting from Casari (2009),
we created situations in which, given (time-inconsistent) elicited t and t′, a subject should show
a choice reversal. Assume the subject has a decision to make in the future, at time t, between
a smaller-sooner payment that is paid at time t plus a front-end delay FED, ($S, t + FED),
and a larger-later payment that is paid with some further delay d, ($L, t + FED + d). The
subject’s future self, who’s “now” is at time t, will have a willingness to wait t for the larger
2To examine a different research question, the first part featured additional choices that allowed to compare
time inconsistency classifications based on three different methods: TTO, equivalent delay functions, and a
traditional intertemporal choice reversal task. We report these results in our paper Greiner and Zhang (2020).
3Table 4 in the Online Appendix summarizes the 8 intertemporal choice questions presented to subjects, and
Figure 2 ibid. displays a screenshot of the multiple price list.
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payment. The subject’s current self, who thinks now about that future choice at time t, will
have a willingness to wait of t′. If t and t′ differ, and if t ≤ d ≤ t′ − 1 (in case of present bias)
or t′ ≤ d ≤ t− 1 (in case of future bias), then we should observe a choice reversal, in that the
current self would decide differently than the future self.
Thus, we design binary choices between ($S, t + FED) and ($L, t + FED + d), and in
order to maximize the differences between preferences of current and future self, we choose a
delay d at the midpoint of the range of predicted choice reversals, d = t+t
′
−1
2
.4 Given these two
options, we offered subjects (that is: their current self) the possibility to commit their future
self to one of these options. In particular, subjects could decide between leaving the choice to
their future self, or committing their future self to one of the options.5
We based the commitment offers on TTO sequences 1 ($S=$100, FED=1 week) and 4
($S=$200, FED=5 weeks). For each of these situations, we designed 8 commitment options
that varied whether commitment was soft (costs added to the action that is supposed to be
avoided) or strict (restricting the future choice set), and in the cost/benefit of the commitment
contract (in time or money).6 Table 1 summarizes the altogether 16 commitment questions,
and Online Appendix B exemplarily lists the full text of all commitment questions, assuming
a present-biased decision-maker.
While sophisticated biased subjects should accept an commitment option (if its direct cost
are sufficiently low or its implicit costs sufficiently high), na¨ıve biased subjects believe to be
time-consistent and thus should accept a commitment option only if it comes with a benefit,
just as truly time-consistent subjects.
Measurement of cognitive ability. We used an automated version of the operation span
test (Turner and Engle, 1989; Unsworth et al., 2005), implemented in zTree (Fischbacher,
2007), to measure subjects working memory. After a practice trial, 75 math problems and 75
letter recalling questions are randomly ordered and organized into 12 task sets of 3 to 7 pairs
each. Each task set repeatedly asks the subjects to solve math problems and at the same
time remember letters displayed on the screen under time pressure. At the end of a task set,
a recall screen asks for the sequence of letters in the correct order. We calculate a subjects
cognitive score as the sum of the number of correctly answered math and correctly recalled
letters. Subjects were paid according to their performance in the test.
4If the mid-point was not an integer number, we rounded down for present-biased and up for future-biased
people.
5If a subject exhibited present-bias, she was assigned questions where commitment options lead to the choice
of the larger-later payment at a future date; if future-bias was detected, the subject was assigned questions
where choosing the smaller-sooner payment is induced by commitment.
6Commitment contract features such as strict vs. soft commitment options or monetary vs. time costs have
also been examined by Augenblick et al. (2015), Beshears et al. (forthcoming), Casari (2009), and Houser et al.
(2018).
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Survey and vignette questions. A questionnaire collected subject’s demographic informa-
tion and information on their real-world financial situation. We incentivized proper attention
to the questions by including four control questions with obvious answers, where wrong
answers (due to inattention) would attract a financial penalty.7 The questionnaire contained
three binary questions in small vignette scenarios on real-life commitment behavior. One asked
about the willingness to accept a commitment savings product, another about accepting a
mutual bet to quit smoking, and a third one about a mutual bet to go to the gym regularly.8
Experimental procedures. The experiment was conducted in August 2012 at the BizLab of
the University of New South Wales with 87 subjects in 6 sessions, each lasting about 90 min-
utes. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). All parts of the experiment were
programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) except for the questionnaire that was implemented in
Qualtrics.9 Experimental payoffs had three components. First, all subjects received a show-up
fee of AU$5 and questionnaire fee of AU$5 (less any penalties for wrong answers to attention
checks). Second, subjects received cash conditional on their performance in the cognitive test,
on average AU$12.94. And third, 6 subjects were randomly selected for payoff of their time
preference and commitment choices (they received AU$220 in 1 week, 2 x AU$200 in 7 and 12
weeks, and 3 x AU$240 in 11, 25, and 58 weeks, respectively).
Gift cards were chosen for the latter component in order to prevent potential arbitrage
behaviors through investment of earned payoffs outside of the experiment (thus replacing en-
dogenous waiting options). The gift cards from the Coles and Myer group, which run thousands
of supermarkets and department stores in Australia, could also be partially used and thus func-
tioned like cash earmarked for consumption. At the beginning of each session, we displayed
the gift cards to all subjects, and declared that the Business School of the University of New
South Wales guaranteed their experimental income, in particular delayed payments. The gift
card payments were sent by Australian Express Post Platinum service to ensure arrival on the
promised date.
7Seven subjects answered 1 out of 4 control questions wrongly, no subject made more mistakes. We report
below when excluding these six subjects would affect the results of our analysis.
8The three questions are contained in Online Appendix C.
9Appendix F includes the experimental instructions, and Appendix G displays some screenshots.
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III Results
Preliminaries. Based on the first part of the experiment, for the sequence with $L=$100
and FED=1 week ($L=$200 and FED=5 weeks), 37% (33%) of subjects were classified as
present-biased, 33% (29%) as future-biased, as 30% (38%) of subjects were either consistent
or could not be classified. In part 2, present-biased (future-biased) subjects were offered
commitment options that corrected present bias (future bias), while all other subjects were
randomly assigned to either a present-bias or a future-bias correcting commitment option.
Cognitive scores ranged from 81 to 149, with a mean of 129.4 and a standard deviation of 13.3
(see Figure 3 in Online Appendix A for the distribution).
Laboratory commitment decisions. Table 1 reports for all 16 commitment questions, how
many of present or future biased subjects took up the commitment options designed for them.
We also list the predictions for sophisticated and nave biased subjects, as discussed in Section
2. Between 16% and 31% of biased subjects accept an option that restricts their future choice
and does not come at any costs, with present-biased and future-biased subjects showing quite
some similarity.10 If strict commitment is costly, acceptance rates decrease significantly, more
so when the costs is monetary (2/4) than when it represents waiting time (3 days). On the other
hand, acceptance rates increase to 44% to 55% when a strict commitment option comes with an
additional benefit of 3 days less waiting time. Soft commitment, which features no direct but
only implicit costs (that only need to be paid if the temptation is given in) seems to be much
less popular than strict commitment options. Only between 0% and 7% of subjects choose to
commit themselves by applying penalties of $2, $4, or 1 week on choosing the tempting option
in the future. Only when such a commitment is sweetened with an additional benefit of 3 days
for choosing the (now) preferred option in the future, between 32% and 52% of subjects opt
for commitment.
We ran Probit regression models, reported in Table 2, that explore drivers of accepting
a commitment option based on a subject’s time-preferences and cognitive performance and
features of the commitment device. The independent “Time Inconsistency” indicates whether
the subject was (present- or future-) biased. “Cognitive Score” is the normalized score achieved
in the Automated Operation Span test. Our main interest is on the interaction effect “TI x
CogScore” which estimates how the likelihood to commit changes for time-inconsistent people
when cognitive performance is higher. As controls we include the “Patience level” of the subject
equaling the average willingness to wait in the two related time preference questions, “Soft
commitment” indicating whether this was a soft commitment (rather than a strict commitment)
10We note that in his experiment, Casari (2009) finds up to 60 percent of present-biased subjects to accept
commitment options.
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TABLE 1: Take-up rates of commitment options
Commitment Pred for Pred for Take-up Take-up
question Q sophisticated na¨ıve present-biased future-biased
biased subjects biased subjects subjects subjects
$100 stakes, 1 week FED
Strict commitment
No cost for C 1 100% indiff. 28.1% 31.0%
$2 cost for C 2 dep. on tradeoff 0% 6.3% 6.9%
3 days cost for C 3 dep. on tradeoff 0% 18.8% 17.2%
3 days benefit for C 4 100% 100% 53.1% 55.2%
Soft commitment
$2 penalty on T 5 dep. on tradeoff indiff. 0.0% 0.0%
$6 penalty on T 6 dep. on tradeoff indiff. 0.0% 0.0%
1 week penalty on T 7 dep. on tradeoff indiff. 3.1% 0.0%
1 week penalty on T 8 dep. on tradeoff 100% 50.0% 48.3%
+3 days benefit for P
$200 stakes, 5 weeks FED
Strict commitment
No cost for C 9 100% indiff. 31.0% 16.0%
$2 cost for C 10 dep. on tradeoff 0% 3.4% 4.0%
3 days cost for C 11 dep. on tradeoff 0% 17.2% 8.0%
3 days benefit for C 12 100% 100% 51.7% 44.0%
Soft commitment
$2 penalty on T 13 dep. on tradeoff indiff. 6.9% 4.0%
$6 penalty on T 14 dep. on tradeoff indiff. 3.4% 4.0%
1 week penalty on T 15 dep. on tradeoff indiff. 3.4% 4.0%
1 week penalty on T 16 dep. on tradeoff 100% 51.7% 32.0%
+3 days benefit for P
Notes: “C” stands for “deciding for the commitment option now”, “T” refers to “choosing the tempting option
in the future”, and “P” to “choosing the (now) preferred option in the future.” “Q” refers to the commitment
question number.
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question, and the commitment devices actual costs and implicit costs, the calculation of which
are detailed in Online Appendix D. We report separate estimations for whether the commitment
option corrected present bias or future bias, and whether the questions addressed $100 stakes
with a one-week FED or $200 stakes with a 5 weeks FED.11
TABLE 2: Probit estimations of commitment option
acceptance
Correcting present-bias Correcting future-bias
$100, 1w $200, 5w $100, 1w $200, 5w
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Time-inconsistent 0.014 0.019 0.016 -0.018
(0.060) (0.056) (0.055) (0.048)
Cognitive Score 0.002 0.019 0.049* 0.057*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.034)
TI × CogScore 0.036 -0.072 -0.031 0.046
(0.040) (0.054) (0.048) (0.067)
Patience level 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Soft commitment -0.125** -0.105*** -0.127** -0.040
(0.063) (0.041) (0.063) (0.054)
Actual cost -7.146*** -8.704*** -6.031*** -11.194***
(1.350) (1.644) (1.252) (1.816)
Implicit cost -1.198 -2.132** 0.519 -1.22
(0.781) (0.911) (1.439) (1.362)
N 368 400 328 296
Log-Likelihood -157.23 -168.26 -136.92 -94.97
Notes: We report average marginal effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the subject level and given in parentheses. Partial effects for the interaction term are
calculated following Norton et al. (2004).
Table 2 reports the results of our Probit estimations of commitment choices. We obtain
a similar pattern of estimates for commitment decisions that correct either direction of bias.
With respect to our main variables of interest, we do not find support for the hypothesis that
commitment demand would be mainly driven by time-inconsistent but sophisticated people. As
a matter of fact, neither time-consistency nor the cognitive score nor their interaction have a
significant impact on the likelihood of taking up a commitment device. (The only exception are
weakly positive effects of a higher cognitive score on the take-up rate for commitment devices
that correct future-biased, but this effect seems to exist independently of whether the subject
is indeed time-consistent or not and disappears when we include other demographic controls.)
The main drivers of whether commitment is accepted or not seem to be the properties
11We did a number of robustness checks, including controlling for subjects’ demographic characteristics, which
are reported in Online Appendix E. None of them would change our conclusions here.
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of the specific commitment option. Consistent with our observations above, soft commit-
ment options (which impose penalties on giving in to temptation) are less preferred than
strict commitment options (where future choice is restricted). The size of direct costs or
benefits of commitment has a significant negative effect on whether the commitment is ac-
cepted or not. The effect of implicit costs is also negative in most cases, but not significantly so.
Vignette commitment questions. In the survey part of the experiment, 52% of subjects
expressed interest towards the saving product, 57% would commit to do regular exercise, and
91% agreed to commit to quit smoking. Since the three commitment devices are targeted to-
wards present-biased people, Figure 1 compares the commitment rates for the three questions
between subjects identified to have present bias and other people.12 We do not observe dif-
ferences in commitment rates between present-biased and other people (Fishers exact tests;
p = 0.502, p = 1.000, and p = 0.259 for the savings, smoking, and exercise vignette question,
respectively).
FIGURE 1: Commitment rates to questions
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We use Probit regression models to analyze the interaction between being present-bias
and having a high cognitive performance in explaining commitment take-up in the vignette
questions. The independent “Present-biased” is an indicator whether the subject was classified
as present-biased, or not. The “Patience level” here is the average waiting time across all 8
timed payment choices from Part 1 of the experiment.
Table 3 presents the results, separately for each of the three vignette questions. As before,
our main interest is in the interaction effect “Present-biased × Cognitive Score”. While for the
12To classify subjects here we use all four TTO sequences and assign the most common classification across
these four sequences. See Greiner and Zhang (2020) for details on this and other classification approaches.
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contexts of quitting smoking and exercising the detected bias and measured cognitive perfor-
mance cannot explain the take-up of a commitment device, for the decision to take-up a savings
commitment product, our results are in line with the theoretical prediction. The interaction
effect between present bias and cognitive score is positive and statistically significant while the
two main effects are not different from zero.13
TABLE 3: Probit regression results on likelihood to take up
commitment in the three vignette questions
Commitment context Savings Quitting smoking Exercising
Present-biased 0.098 -0.049 -0.177
(0.108) (0.072) (0.108)
Cognitive Score -0.010 0.016 -0.033
(0.051) (0.028) (0.054)
Present-biased × Cognitive Score 0.259*** -0.067 0.018
(0.105) (0.082) (0.113)
Patience level -0.006 -0.007** -0.011*
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
N 87 87 87
LL -56.75 -22.93 -56.74
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Partial effects of interaction terms are calcu-
lated following Norton et al. (2004).
IV Conclusion
In this paper we aimed to measure (potential for) sophistication of time-inconsistent decision-
makers via a cognitive test, in order to explore the relation between sophistication and demand
for commitment devices. In our experiment, we first measure time-preferences and detect
time-inconsistencies, then present participants with new sets of questions that offer tailor-made
commitment devices, and finally measure participants’ performance in an automated operation
span test testing working memory. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, we find no relation
between cognitive performance and take-up of commitment devices for time-inconsistent peo-
ple. Interestingly, while cognitive ability is of little help in explaining laboratory commitment
13In robustness tests, demographic characteristics only played a role for exercise commitment choices. In none
of the three models their inclusion affected the estimates of the interaction effect. In addition, we explored
the correlation between laboratory commitment behavior and answers to the vignette questions, and found
no relation. When we exclude 7 subjects who made errors in control questions from the analysis, we find
no changes for smoking and exercise commitment questions (other than the coefficient for Patience level for
Exercising shifting significance level from 10% to 5%). For saving commitment decisions, the interaction term
stays significant at the 1% level, but additionally the estimated marginal effect of Present-biased is positive
and significant at the 10% level.
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choices, it has predictive power for subjects’ self-stated demand for a savings commitment prod-
uct. We thus contribute to a growing literature that finds individual commitment choices to
be noisy and often inconsistent. However, we also document and replicate reasonable reactions
to features of commitment devices, such as preference for strict vs. soft commitment options,
and sensitivity to direct and – less so – to implicit costs.
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Online Appendix
A Additional Figures and Tables
TABLE 4: Intertemporal choice questions in time preference elicitation
Seq Question Smaller-sooner Front-end Larger-later Elicited willingness
Nb. q payment $Sq delay FEDq payment $Lq to wait tq
1 1 $100 1 week $130 t1
5 $100 1 week+t1 $130 t5
2 2 $100 5 weeks $130 t2
6 $100 5 weeks+t2 $130 t6
3 3 $200 1 week $240 t3
7 $200 1 week+t3 $240 t7
4 4 $200 5 weeks $240 t4
8 $200 5 weeks+t4 $240 t8
FIGURE 2: Screenshot of example intertemporal choice question
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B Commitment questions used in the experiment
Across each set of 8 questions we altered the design and cost of commitment. Four commitment
questions C1, C2, C3, and C4 imposed a strict commitment, by limiting future choices to the
now preferred alternative (based on elicited preferences), so there is no chance for temptation
later. This option could be chosen for free (C1), come at a cost of $2 (C2) or a (further) time
cost of 3 days (C3), or could even carry a time benefit of 3 days (C4). A typical strict question
(with a cost of $2) would read:
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 10 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 6 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 10 weeks you will have no choice, 6 weeks later your will receive $128.
To equalize transaction costs between options A and B, subjects who chose option B were
also asked to send a confirmation message (no choice could be made) via email on the designated
date.
The other four commitment questions C5, C6, C7, and C8 offered a form of soft commit-
ment, which retained the choice flexibility but imposed a penalty on the tempting sub-option
for the future self, making it less attractive. The costs are implicit, since they do not have to be
incurred if commitment is successful and the current selfs option is chosen in the future. The
penalty imposed on choosing the tempting sub-option could be monetary costs of $2 (C5) or
$6 (C6), a time cost of one week (C7), or the time cost of one week for choosing the tempting
option combined with a reward of 3 days for choosing the option preferred by the current self
(C8). A typical soft commitment option with a $6 implicit cost would read:
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 10 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 6 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 10 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option B1: 1 week later you receive $94 or
Sub-option B2: 6 weeks later you receive $130.
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Assume a present-biased decision-maker who answered, when asked about her willingness to
wait for $130 vs. $100 with a 1 week initial front-end delay, “7 weeks” for t and then “11
weeks” for t′. Then, we would use a d = ⌊ t+t
′
−1
2
⌋ = ⌊7+11−1
2
⌋ = 8 weeks, such that the decision
situation for which the participant is offered commitment contracts takes place in 7 weeks
and is between $100 in 7+1 weeks and $130 in 7+1+8 weeks. The 8 different commitment
questions presented to the participant were then:
C1 (strict commitment, no cost):
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 9 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 7 weeks you will have no choice, 9 weeks later your will receive $130.
C2 (strict commitment, $2 cost):
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 9 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 7 weeks you will have no choice, 9 weeks later your will receive $128.
C3 (strict commitment, 3 days cost):
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 9 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 7 weeks you will have no choice, 9 weeks and 3 days later your will receive $130.
C4 (strict commitment, 3 days benefit):
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 9 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 7 weeks you will have no choice, 8 weeks and 4 days later your will receive $130.
C5 (soft commitment, $2 implicit costs):
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You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 9 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option B1: 1 week later you receive $98 or
Sub-option B2: 9 weeks later you receive $130.
C6 (soft commitment, $6 implicit costs):
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 9 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option B1: 1 week later you receive $94 or
Sub-option B2: 9 weeks later you receive $130.
C7 (soft commitment, 1 week implicit costs):
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 9 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option B1: 2 weeks later you receive $100 or
Sub-option B2: 9 weeks later you receive $130.
C8 (soft commitment, 1 week implicit costs and 3 days benefit):
You are asked to choose between Option A and Option B today.
Option A: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option A1: 1 week later you receive $100 or
Sub-option A2: 9 weeks later you receive $130
Option B: In 7 weeks you will have to decide between
Sub-option B1: 2 weeks later you receive $100 or
Sub-option B2: 8 weeks and 4 days later you receive $130.
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C Survey vignette questions on real-life commitment behavior
The first vignette question referred to the finance domain and was motivated by the field study
conducted by Ashraf et al. (2006). It asks:
If you were offered a saving product which does not allow you to withdraw funds
until the funds on your account reach a goal date or target amount. Would you sign
up for this?
The other two vignette questions address behavior in the health domain. One of them asks:
Assume you are a smoker. You desperately want to quit smoking for better health.
At the same time, a friend of yours also wants to quit smoking. Both of you plan
to reduce nicotine intake over time and believe that in 10 weeks (a date agreed on
by both of you) you will be smoke-free. Now, your friend offers you a bet: whoever
is still smoking after the designated time will have to pay the other party $200.
Would you take this bet?
The other question asks:
Assume you intend to attend gym sessions regularly, but fail to do so due to discom-
fort after exercising. A friend of yours, experiencing the same situation, is willing
to work out 3 times a week with you for the next month (on a date agreed on by
both of you). S/He offers you a bet: whoever fails to stick to the plan will have to
pay the other party $20 upon each time s/he does not go to the gym. Would you
take this bet?
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D Calculation of direct and implicit commitment costs
We calculate the size of direct and implicit costs of a (strict or soft) commitment option following
Casari (2009)’s approach. We employ the simple interest rule under the assumption that utility
is linear in money to compute the net present value of a commitment cost.
The “actual cost” of a (strict or soft) commitment option is the amount directly paid for
being able to commit the future choice according to current preferences (i.e. to the larger-later
payment for present-biased people or to the smaller-sooner payment for future-biased people,
respectively). We express it as the relative loss in option B compared to option A in terms
of net present value (NPV) on the preferred payment, calculated based on the observed
impatience level in the relevant time preference sequence,
NPV (LA)−NPV (LB)
NPV (LA)
for correcting present-bias, and
NPV (SA)−NPV (SB)
NPV (SA)
for correcting future-bias.
The “implicit cost” of a (soft) commitment option is the penalty which is only imposed
when the tempting choice is chosen in the future. That is, “implicit cost” does not have to
be paid if the commitment device works properly. We express it as the relative loss for the
tempting payment alternative in option B compared to the tempting payment alternative in
option A in terms of net present values, calculated based on the observed impatience level in
the relevant time preference sequence,
NPV (SA)−NPV (SB)
NPV (SA)
for correcting present-bias, and
NPV (LA)−NPV (LB)
NPV (LA)
for correcting future-bias.
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E Robustness checks for the main regressions
Table 6 reports results from regressions similar to the ones reported in Table 2 in the main
text, but which additionally control for subjects’ demographic information.
As demographics controls we use “Liquidity constrained” and “Has credit card” as dummies
indicating whether the subject would have difficulty to borrow $1000 within two weeks and uses
a credit card, respectively, a gender indicator Male and a variable for Age, whether the subject
was born as “Australian” or not, whether they have achieved a “Bachelor degree” or a “Master
degree” (baseline is a High School degree), whether they study in a “Business/Economics
major” or not, whether they are currently “Employed” or not, and a standardized score from a
self-control assessment in the questionnaire (original scores range from 77 to 147, with a mean
of 112.6 and a standard deviation of 15.5). Table 5 gives an overview over these variables.
TABLE 5: Means and standard deviations of
demographic variables
Variable Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Age 21.7 2.8
Male (0/1) 0.529
Australian (0/1) 0.299
Employment (0/1) 0.356
Bachelor (0/1) 0.172
Master (0/1) 0.046
Business major (0/1) 0.448
Liquidity-constrained (0/1) 0.138
Have a credit card (0/1) 0.448
Self-control score 112.6 15.5
Including individual characteristics as independents does not change the interpretation of
our main effects of interest, but demographics also contribute to explaining commitment deci-
sions. Being liquidity-constrained is negatively related to commitment that allows to correct
present-bias and positively related to commitment that allows to correct future-bias (signifi-
cant only for higher stakes). Subjects who have achieved a bachelors degree, compared to those
with a high school degree, are less likely to commit. Older people are more likely commit to
a present-bias correction (but keep in mind that the average age of our subjects is 21.7 with a
standard deviation of only 2.8). Being an Australian or having obtained a Master degree are
also detected as significant influences, but these seem not to be consistent across models.
We did several further robustness checks of our results. For example, we also ran a larger
model that comprises data from all four cases and adds the independents “Commitment ques-
tion type” (correcting present bias or future bias) and “Stake size”. The results are basically
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the same, with the only difference being that the coefficient for “Implicit costs” becomes sig-
nificant, and that some coefficients on demographics (where they are inconsistently estimated
across the four groups) become insignificant.
When we exclude seven subjects who made errors in control questions from our estimations
reported in Table 2 and Table 6, then the interaction effects “TI × CogScore” in Models 2 and 6
are -0.111 and -0.129, and significant at the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. This, however,
goes even contrary to our initial hypothesis of a positive interaction effect of time-inconsistency
and cognitive performance.
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TABLE 6: Probit estimations of commitment option
acceptance, including demographics
Correcting present-bias Correcting future-bias
$100, 1w $200, 5w $100, 1w $200, 5w
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Time-inconsistent 0.057 0.053 -0.013 0.017
(0.052) (0.058) (0.061) (0.048)
Cognitive Score -0.018 0.024 0.06 0.036
(0.027) (0.028) (0.044) (0.028)
TI × CogScore -0.019 -0.092 -0.027 0.015
(0.048) (0.060) (0.060) (0.052)
Patience level 0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Soft commitment -0.131** -0.109*** -0.132** -0.047
(0.061) (0.039) (0.064) (0.052)
Actual cost -7.112*** -8.694*** -5.973*** -11.682***
(1.359) (1.540) (1.200) (1.661)
Implicit cost -0.972 -1.948** 0.729 -1.029
(0.807) (0.835) (1.379) (1.249)
Liquidity -0.068 -0.116** -0.059 0.134*
constrained (0.068) (0.057) (0.084) (0.069)
Has credit card 0.038 -0.039 -0.041 -0.000
(0.058) (0.082) (0.060) (0.053)
Male -0.046 -0.023 -0.002 -0.031
(0.053) (0.059) (0.050) (0.050)
Age 0.020** 0.019* -0.017 -0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.025)
Australian -0.067 0.037 -0.096* -0.001
(0.057) (0.087) (0.058) (0.089)
Bachelor degree -0.112* -0.103* -0.001 -0.259*
(0.062) (0.057) (0.068) (0.142)
Master degree -0.125*** -0.000 0.510** omitted
(0.046) (0.106) (0.231)
Business/Ec major 0.066 0.065 -0.055 0.013
(0.060) (0.061) (0.049) (0.070)
Employed -0.012 -0.045 0.074 0.077
(0.053) (0.056) (0.051) (0.047)
Self-control score 0.035 -0.010 -0.005 0.042
(0.029) (0.036) (0.028) (0.027)
N 368 400 328 296
Log-Likelihood -146.83 -160.86 -127.04 -83.10
Notes: We report average marhinal effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
subject level and given in parentheses. Partial effects for the interaction term are cal-
culated following Norton et al. (2004).
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F Experimental instructions
F.A General Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment.
These instructions are the same for all the participants. From now on, please do not
communicate with other participants. If you have a question please raise your hand. One of
the experimenters will attend to you and answer your questions. Please switch your mobile
phone off now. Please use the computer only for entering your decisions. Please only use the
pen and forms provided. Dont start or end any programs, and do not change any settings. If
you dont conform to these rules during the experiment we will have to exclude you from the
any payoffs.
To ensure privacy of choices, each participant is seated in a cubicle. The experiment will be
conducted by participants entering their choices via computers that are located in those cubicles.
This experiment consists of 4 different parts.
You are paid a show-up fee of $5, a reward conditional on your performance in part 3 of the
experiment, and a $5 flat-fee for filling in a questionnaire in part 4.
Additionally, at the end of this experiment one participant will be randomly drawn. This
participant is paid according to one of his/her choices in either part 1 or part 2, randomly
selected, with payoffs ranging from $100 to $240. If you are the selected participant, your
rewards will be paid with a Myers & Coles gift certificate. The ASBLab will send the gift
certificate to you by post. “A payment in 1 week” means the certificate will be sent to you
in 6 days and arrive at your address in 7 days (exactly one week). “A payment in t weeks
and 2 days” means the certificate will be sent to you in t weeks and 1 day and arrive at your
address in t weeks and 2 days. Please note that we send the gift certificates by Australian Post
“Express Post Platinum” and thereby make sure that your gift certificate(s) will arrive at your
address on the exact date.
F.B Instructions for Time Preferences Elicitation
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices between alternatives
concerning different valued gift certificates which you will receive at different points in time.
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You will encounter 16 different choice sets (computer screens), each of which consists of
26 simple choices. Each choice asks you to make a decision between “Payment Alternative
A” and “Payment Alternative B”. “Payment Alternative A” is always a smaller-valued
gift-certificate receivable in the near future while “Payment Alternative B” is always
a larger-valued gift-certificate receivable some time later. On each screen (choice set),
the amounts of gift cards A and B and the payoff time of gift card A are fixed, and the
only thing which changes from one row to the next row is the time when you receive gift card B.
To enforce consistency among your choices on one screen, we will assume that if you prefer gift
card A over gift card B when gift card B is paid in X weeks, then you also prefer A over B in
X+1 weeks. In other words: Whenever you choose A over B, we will assume that in all rows
below you also prefer A over B, and whenever you choose B over A we will assume that in all
rows above you prefer B over A. The computer will correct this automatically on the screen
whenever you make a choice.
At the end of the experiment one of your 16x26 choices will be selected for payoff. (We
will first randomly select one out of 16 choice sets, and then randomly select one choice row
out of the 26 choice rows in this set.) This choice will be implemented according to your
decision. So, for example, if “choice set 8, choice row 14” is randomly selected, then we
will look at your decision in set 8, choice 14. If you chose A, you will receive Payment Al-
ternative A in that choice, if you chose B, you will receive Payment Alternative B in that choice.
As a result, each of your choices is equally likely to be selected for payoff. So you should
carefully think about each choice, because it may be selected and your decision implemented
exactly as described.
At the end of the experiment, one of the participants in this session will be randomly selected
and paid out either for Part 1 according to the procedure described above, or for Part 2.
F.C Instructions for Commitment Questions
For this part of the experiment we will ask you to make choices on two separate days: one
today during the experimental session, and the other at a specified later date.
Today you are asked to choose between Option A and Option B.
Some days later (the exact number of days will be displayed on the screen) we will contact
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you by email. If you have chosen Option A today, we will later ask you to decide between
Option A1 and Option A2. If you have chosen Option B today, we will later ask you to decide
between Option B1 and B2 when they are available.
For example, the choice today could be:
Option A: In 10 weeks you will have to decide between
A1: right then you receive $100, or
A2: 13 weeks later you receive $130.
Option B: In 10 weeks you will have no choices, 13 weeks later you will receive $130.
Basically, choosing Option B means that you commit to getting a $130 certificate in 10 + 13
weeks. When you choose Option A you dont commit, and will choose in 10 weeks whether you
take a $100 certificate right then or you wait a further 13 weeks to get a $130 certificate.
As another example, your choice today could be:
Option A: In 3 weeks you will have to decide between
A1: 5 weeks later you receive $200, or
A2: 20 weeks later you receive $240.
Option B: In 3 weeks you will have to decide between
B1: 5 weeks later you receive $196, or
B2: 20 weeks later you receive $240.
Here choosing Option B basically assigns a penalty of $4 to yourself in case in 3 weeks you
choose to get the certificate of $200 in 5 weeks instead of waiting a further 20 weeks for the
certificate of $240.
All your choices in this part will be similar to these two examples. Altogether you will make
16 choices.
After finishing the experiment, one of you will be randomly selected and paid out according to
one of his/her choices in either Part 1 or Part 2. That is, if you are the selected participant
to be paid out in Part 2, then we will check whether you chose Option A and Option B at the
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selected choice. According to your choice, we will contact you in the specified number of weeks
by email (asblabexperiment@gmail.com) and let you choose between Sub-options A1 and
A2 (if you selected Option A today), or Sub-options B1 and B2 (if you selected Option B today).
Please note that what amount you will be rewarded and at which time point depends on what
you choose in the experiment.
F.D Instruction for Test of Cognitive Ability
In this section, you need to try to remember a sequence of letters which appear on the
computer screen and at the same time solve simple math problems. The better you are in this
task, the more you will earn.
The specific instruction for this section will be presented on the screen. This section consists
the practice part and the real trials. The practice part helps you get familiar with what to
expect, and will not be paid. In the real trials, your payment will depend on your performance.
Here is how you get paid in the real trials:
For the subtask of recalling letters, you will get 10 cents for each correctly remembered
letter.
For the subtask of solving math problems, the benchmark is 50 percent. If you answer
more than 50 percent of math questions correctly, then you will receive 20 cents for each
correct answer above 50 percent. If you get less than 50 percent of math questions correctly,
you will be deducted 10 cents for each wrong answer below 50 percent.
There are different versions of this section, so other participants will not be remembering the
same letters and calculating the same math problems as you are.
Please complete this test quietly. You are not allowed to make any notes on paper, or to
communicate with other participants.
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G Screenshots of commitment questions as displayed in the experiment
FIGURE 4: Screenshot of example commitment question
($100 stakes, present bias, strict commitment)
FIGURE 5: Screenshot of example commitment question
($200 stakes, future bias, soft commitment)
28
